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a b s t r a c t
The von Neumann and Newman poker models are simplified two-person poker models in
which hands aremodeled by real values drawn uniformly at random from the unit interval.
We analyze a simple extension of both models that introduces an element of uncertainty
about the final strength of each player’s own hand, as is present in real poker games.
Whenever a showdown occurs, an unfair coinwith fixed bias q is tossed, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/2.With
probability 1− q, the higher hand value wins as usual, but, with the remaining probability
q, the lower handwins. Bothmodels favor the first player for q = 0 and are fair for q = 1/2.
Our somewhat surprising result is that the first player’s expected payoff increases with q
as long as q is not too large. That is, the first player can exploit the additional uncertainty
introduced by the coin toss and extract even more value from his opponent.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Simplified models of poker were first studied in a game-theoretic framework by Borel [2] and von Neumann [10] in
the 1920s. Von Neumann’s results were published later in the seminal book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior with
Morgenstern [12]. He considered the following (0, 1) two-player game. There is an initial pot of size P (consisting of players’
antes). Each player is dealt a ‘hand’, i.e., a real number x, respectively y, drawn independently and uniformly at random from
the unit interval. After X has inspected x, he can make a bet of a chips or check. If he bets, Y can either call (i.e., match X’s
bet of a chips) or fold (i.e., concede the pot to X), where of course he can base this decision on his own hand y. If X checks
or if his bet is called by Y, a showdown occurs, i.e., both hands are revealed and the player with the higher hand value wins
the pot and all bets made. Note that only X is allowed to make a bet. Thus he has an advantage over Y, who can only react.
In the above model, one can either prescribe the amount a that X bets if he opts to bet, or let X choose the size of his
bet freely as a function of his hand x. The former case is the game originally studied by von Neumann. Here, we assume
a = P (pot size bet) for simplicity. Von Neumann showed that in optimal play X has an expected payoff of (5/9)P . A key
insight of his solution is that bluffing is a game-theoretic necessity: X will not only bet with his good hands, but also with
very low-ranked hands. These bluff bets aim at inducing his opponent to make more calls, even with only mediocre hands,
which in turn enables X to extract more value from Y with his good hands. The case of variable bet size a(x) was studied
by Newman [8] in the 1950s. Certainly, in this setup, player X has an even greater advantage—Newman proved an expected
payoff of (4/7)P in optimal play.
Several extensions and variants of these poker models have been studied in the literature. In particular, there are
two ‘intermediate’ models in which X can choose his bet more freely than in von Neumann’s model, but not completely
unrestricted as in Newman’s model: Karlin and Restrepo [7] (see also [9]) analyzed the case where X may choose his bet a
from a finite number of prescribed bet sizes a1, . . . , an, and Sakai [9] investigated the case where X is allowed to choose his
bet freely in an interval [0, amax]. Much research has also been devoted to analyzing more complex bet structures, in which
both X and Y are allowed to bet, raise, or re-raise [1,4–7].
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1.1. The von Neumann and Newman model with flip
We consider the following extension of the above model: whenever a showdown occurs, an unfair coin with bias q is
tossed, where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/2 is a fixed parameter known to both players. With probability 1 − q, the higher hand value
wins as usual, but, with the remaining probability q, the lower hand wins. We shall refer to this as a flip of the hand values:
initially strong hands become weak, and vice versa.
This extension is motivated by the fact that, in most real-world poker variants, players are not only ignorant about the
opponent’s hand, but also about their own final hand value. In Texas Hold’em, for example, a player’s final hand strength is
a function of both his private hand cards and so-called ‘community cards’ that are revealed over the course of the game; a
weak starting hand thus may turn into a very strong hand at showdown if the right community cards appear. The flip in our
model is a simple (and rather extreme) way of introducing a similar feature into the models described above.
Obviously, setting q = 0 yields the original von Neumann and Newmanmodels, and the expected payoffs of X in optimal
play are as given above. In the other extreme, q = 1/2, each player has probability 1/2 of having the better hand at
showdown, regardless of the realizations of x and y. Thus, for q = 1/2, the game reduces to a fair coin toss, and neither
player will have an advantage: Y will call every bet, and regardless of X’s strategy each player has expected payoff P/2 in
both models.
In light of these two extreme cases, one might be tempted to conclude that the uncertainty about players’ own hands
introduced by the flip is always bad for the bettor X, who is in control of the game (recall that Y can only react). More
specifically, one might think that player X’s expected payoff as a function of q is decreasing on the entire interval [0, 1/2].
As we shall see, something altogether different is true.
1.2. Our results
An equilibrium of a two-player game is a pair of (possibly randomized) strategies such that no player can improve his
expected payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. In other words, each strategy is a best response to the other one. As is
well known, in two-player constant-sum games all equilibria have the same expected payoffs, and thus we may define the
value of such a game as the expected payoff of the first player X in any equilibrium pair of strategies (if one exists). Clearly,
the poker games introduced above are constant-sum games with sum P , and we shall present explicit equilibrium pairs of
strategies for both games. Let VI(q) and VII(q) be the values of the von Neumann game (with pot size bet) and the Newman
game with flip probability q, respectively. Certainly, we have VII(q) ≥ VI(q) for all values of q, as in Newman’s model player
X is allowed more flexibility in his betting strategy than in von Neumann’s.
We first present our results for the von Neumann game. As mentioned above, we have VI(0) = (5/9)P ≈ 0.556 P in the
classical case without flip, and trivially VI(1/2) = P/2.
Theorem 1. The value of von Neumann poker with pot size bet and flip probability q is
VI(q) =

27q2 − 32q+ 10
6(9q2 − 10q+ 3)P, q ∈ [0, 1/3]
3− 2q
4
P, q ∈ (1/3, 1/2].
(1)
We give a proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2. Fig. 1 shows VI(q) graphically. VI(q) first increases as we increase q, and attains
its unique maximum for q = 1/3 with a value of (7/12)P ≈ 0.583 P . In [1/3, 1/2], VI(q) decreases linearly. In other words,
as we increase the parameter q, player X can exploit this additional uncertainty about the outcome of the game and extract
even more value from his opponent at first! Only beyond q = 1/3, X gradually loses his advantage.
This behavior of the value function is related to von Neumann’s observation about bluffing and can be explained as
follows. As q increases, X has to make fewer and fewer bluff bets, since gradually the flip q takes over and induces Y into
calling enough of X’s bets. At q = 1/3 something important happens—as we shall show, at this point the optimal strategies
change abruptly (see Fig. 2 in Section 2). For q > 1/3, Y calls every bet since his expected payoff is positive regardless of the
hands x and y. Thus the need for X to bluff vanishes completely, and he can concentrate on extracting value from Y with his
good hands. Due to the abrupt change of strategy, VI(q) is continuous but not smooth at q = 1/3. The value 1/3 stems from
our assumption that a = P; in general, this change of strategies occurs at q∗ satisfying q∗/(1− q∗) = a/(P + a), i.e., at the
point where the odds of a flip occurring equal Y’s ‘pot odds’.
We now present our results for the Newman model. We find it quite remarkable that VII(q) turns out to have the simple
closed form below, as the calculations involved are far more complicated than in the von Neumann case.
Theorem 2. The value of Newman poker with flip probability q is
VII(q) =

16− q
4(7− 2q)P, q ∈ [0, 1/2)
P/2, q = 1/2.
(2)
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Fig. 1. Value VI(q) of von Neumann poker (lower curve) and value VII(q) of Newman poker (upper curve) as a function of the flip probability q. We set
P = 1 for simplicity. VII(q) is discontinuous at q = 1/2.
Fig. 2. Equilibrium strategy pairs for players X and Y as a function of parameter q. The hatched regions indicate with which hands x player Xmakes a (bluff
or value) bet, and the shaded region indicates with which hands y player Y calls X’s bets.
We give a proof of Theorem 2 in Section 3. As shown in Fig. 1, VII(q) increases from (4/7)P ≈ 0.571 P to (31/48)P ≈
0.646 P . Unlike in the von Neumann game, the value function increases in the entire interval [0, 1/2): as the outcome of the
game becomes more and more uncertain, X’s advantage gets larger and larger. We attribute the discontinuity at q = 1/2 to
the fact that X’s bet size a is unlimited. (In fact, in the optimal strategies we present, a(x) diverges both at x = 0 and x = 1
for all values of q; see Fig. 3 in Section 3.) We believe that if a limit on the bet size is imposed as in [9], this discontinuity
disappears, and VII(q) attains a maximum at some q0 < 1/2 instead, similar to the behavior of VI(q).
An interesting feature of the equilibrium pair of strategies we exhibit is that they are discontinuous at a∗ satisfying
q/(1 − q) = a∗/(P + a∗) (see Fig. 3 in Section 3): Y will call all bets of at most a∗ since for such bets his expected payoff
is nonnegative regardless of the hands x and y. Knowing this, X never bets an amount between 0 and a∗. Thus, again the
equation q/(1− q) = a/(P + a) determining the point where the odds of a flip equal Y’s pot odds plays a vital role.
2. The von Neumann model
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. We give an explicit equilibrium pair of deterministic strategies, and compute the
value of the game from there.
Recall that in the von Neumann poker model player X can decide whether to check or to bet a = P after inspecting his
hand x. If X bets, Y either calls or folds depending on his hand y.
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium strategy pair for q = 0 (left) and q = 1/3 (right). Player X’s bet function a(x) is given by the solid line, and Y’s call region C is the
shaded region.
Formally, a deterministic strategy for X is given by an arbitrary (measurable) subset B ⊆ (0, 1) determining for which
hand values x he will make a bet. Similarly, a deterministic strategy for Y is given by an arbitrary (measurable) subset
C ⊆ (0, 1) determining with which hands y he will call if X bets.
To make the formulas more understandable, we write a for the bet and P for the pot, despite the assumption that a = P .
Throughout, we neglect the case x = y, which occurs with probability 0.
2.1. The case 1/3 < q < 1/2
We show that, for any fixed q ∈ (1/3, 1/2), an equilibrium pair of strategies is given by
B = (1/2, 1), (3)
C = (0, 1). (4)
In words, X bets the better half of his hands, and Y calls every bet regardless of his hand.
Claim 3. Y’s calling strategy (4) is a best response to any betting strategy B˜ of player X.
Proof. Note that, if Y folds, his payoff is 0, and if he calls with a hand of y, his expected payoff conditional on X having a hand
x > y is
(P + a)q− a(1− q), (5)
while his expected payoff conditional on X having a hand x < y is
(P + a)(1− q)− aq. (6)
Because 1/2 > q > 1/3 = a/(P + 2a), both (5) and (6) are positive. Thus calling all bets of X indeed corresponds to Y’s
pointwise optimal behavior, regardless of X’s strategy. 
Claim 4. X’s betting strategy (3) is a best response to Y’s calling strategy (4).
Proof. As Y always calls, X’s expected payoff if he bets with a hand of x is given by
x

(P + a)(1− q)− aq+ (1− x)(P + a)q− a(1− q) = P(1− 2q)x+ q+ a(1− 2q)(2x− 1), (7)
and if he checks, by
xP(1− q)+ (1− x)Pq = P(1− 2q)x+ q. (8)
Here, x and 1 − x are the probabilities that Y’s hand y is lower, respectively higher, than x. Since (7) is larger than (8) for
x > 1/2 and smaller for x < 1/2, (3) indeed is a pointwise best response to Y’s calling strategy (4). 
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Let Ex denote X’s expected payoff when holding a hand of x, with X and Y playing strategies (3) and (4). Combining (7)
and (8) and using that a = P , we obtain
Ex =

P((1− 2q)x+ q), x ∈ (0, 1/2]
P(3(1− 2q)x+ 3q− 1), x ∈ (1/2, 1).
Integrating Ex over (0, 1), we obtain VI(q) as stated in Theorem 1 for the case 1/3 < q ≤ 1/2.
2.2. The case 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/3
Before we state and verify an explicit equilibrium pair of strategies, we briefly outline how such strategies can be derived
heuristically. We use the well-known principle of indifference, a more detailed description of which can be found for
example in [3].
We assume that player X bets if and only if his hand x is in the interval (0, x0) (bluff bets) or in (x1, 1) (value bets) for
some fixed numbers x0, x1 ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, we assume that Y calls a bet of X if and only if his hand y is in [y1, 1) for some
fixed y1, x0 ≤ y1 ≤ x1.
Assume that Y’s calling threshold y1 is fixed and known to X. If X bets with a hand x ≤ y1, his payoff is given by
y1P + (1 − y1)

(P + a)q − a(1 − q). Here, the first term corresponds to the case where Y folds, and the second one to
the case where Y calls. Clearly, X should bet if and only if this exceeds (8), which is his expected payoff if he checks. For
continuity reasons, at his bluff threshold x0 the two options should have the same expected payoff (‘at x0, X is indifferent
between betting or checking’), which yields the indifference equation
x0P(1− q)+ (1− x0)Pq != y1P + (1− y1)

(P + a)q− a(1− q). (9)
Similarly, X’s indifference between checking and betting at x1 yields the equation
x1P(1− q)+ (1− x1)Pq != y1P + (x1 − y1)

(P + a)(1− q)− aq+ (1− x1)(P + a)q− a(1− q), (10)
and from Y’s indifference at y1 between calling and folding we obtain
x0

(P + a)(1− q)− aq+ (1− x1)(P + a)q− a(1− q) != 0. (11)
Solving the equation system (9)–(11) observing that a = P yields
x0 = (1− 3q)/D, (12)
x1 = 1− (2− 3q)/D, (13)
y1 = (1− 2q)(5− 9q)/D, (14)
where D = 3(9q2 − 10q+ 3). Note that x0 < y1 < x1 for all values of q. Fig. 2 illustrates these thresholds as q varies from 0
to 1/3.
We prove that, for any fixed q ∈ [0, 1/3], an equilibrium is given by the following pair of strategies. Player X bets if and
only if his hand x is in
B = (0, x0) ∪ (x1, 1), (15)
and player Y calls a bet of X if and only if his hand y is in
C = [y1, 1), (16)
where x0, x1 and y1 given by (12)–(14).
The fact that the strategies (15) and (16) are in equilibrium is proved by the two following claims.
Claim 5. Any calling strategy C˜ of player Y satisfying
y > x1 H⇒ y ∈ C˜ (17)
y < x0 H⇒ y ∉ C˜ (18)
is a best response to X’s betting strategy (15).
Proof. Assume that Y has a hand of y and is facedwith a bet. Clearly, if he folds, his payoff is 0. If he calls, his expected payoff
is the weighted average of (5) and (6), where the weights are the probabilities that x > y, respectively x < y, conditional on
x ∈ B (i.e., X making a bet). If Y’s hand y is between x0 and x1, these conditional probabilities are proportional to 1 − x1,
respectively x0, and Y’s expected payoff is some constant times the left-hand side of (11), which vanishes for x0 and x1 as
defined in (12) and (13). Thus, for hands between x0 and x1, calling and folding have the same expected payoff.
For y < x0, the conditional probabilities in question are proportional to (1− x1)+ (x0 − y) and y, respectively. Thus the
smaller term (5) gets strictly larger weight, and Y’s expected payoff when calling is negative. Analogously, it follows that his
expected payoff when calling with a hand y > x1 is positive. Together this shows that any strategy satisfying (17) and (18)
corresponds to pointwise optimal behavior of Y, which proves the claim. 
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Claim 6. X’s betting strategy (15) is a best response to Y’s calling strategy (16).
Proof. The expected payoff for X if he checks with a hand of x is given by (8). On the other hand, if he bets with a hand
x ≤ y1, his expected payoff is
y1P + (1− y1)

(P + a)q− a(1− q) = P(27q3 − 24q2 + 4q+ 1)/D (19)
independently of x, and if he bets with a hand with a hand x > y1,
y1P + (x− y1)

(P + a)(1− q)− aq+ (1− x)(P + a)q− a(1− q)
= P
−162q3 + 261q2 − 144q+ 27
D
x+ 135q
3 − 192q2 + 91q− 14
D

, (20)
where we used that a = P and y1 as defined in (14). Straightforward calculation yields that (19) is larger than (8) for x < x0
and that (20) is larger than (8) for x > x1, reflecting equalities (9) and (10). Thus (15) is a best response to Y’s calling strategy
(16). 
Let Ex denote X’s expected payoff when holding a hand of x, with X and Y playing strategies (15) and (16). Combining (8),
(19) and (20), we obtain
Ex =

P
27q3 − 24q2 + 4q+ 1
D
, x ∈ (0, x0]
P((1− 2q)x+ q), x ∈ (x0, x1)
P
−162q3 + 261q2 − 144q+ 27
D
x+ 135q
3 − 192q2 + 91q− 14
D

, x ∈ [x1, 1).
Integrating Ex over [0, 1], we obtain VI(q) as stated in Theorem 1 for the case 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/3.
3. The Newman model
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. As in the previous section, we give an equilibrium pair of deterministic strategies
for players X and Y, and compute the value of the game from there. Throughout, we assume that 0 ≤ q < 1/2. As argued in
the introduction, the case q = 1/2 is trivial.
Recall that, in the Newman poker model, X can choose the size of his bet a freely as a function of his hand x. In this
formulation, if Xwants to check, he does so by choosing bet size a = 0. Y sees the size of the bet, and can use this information
together with his hand value y in deciding whether or not to call.
Formally, a deterministic strategy for X is given by an arbitrary (measurable) function a(x) : (0, 1)→ [0,∞)determining
his bet a as a function of his hand x. A deterministic strategy for Y is given by an arbitrary (measurable) subset C ⊆
(0, 1)× [0,∞), which is interpreted as follows: Y calls a bet of awith a hand of y if and only if (y, a) ∈ C.
Before we state and verify an explicit equilibrium pair of strategies, we outline the heuristics that lead to these strategies.
First of all, recall that the expected payoff of Y when calling a bet of a is given by (5) and (6). Since for a at most
a∗ = q
1− 2qP
both terms are nonnegative, Y will call every bet of at most a∗. Similarly to Section 2.1, it follows that X should never bet an
amount 0 < a < a∗ with hands below 1/2, and should always bet at least a∗ with hands above 1/2.
In view of the findings in the von Neumann poker model about mixing value bets with one’s best hands and bluff bets
with one’s worst hands, we assume that X plays as follows. He bets a > a∗ if and only if his hand is either x0(a) or x1(a) for
some functions x0,1 : [a∗,∞)→ (0, 1). We assume that x0(a) is strictly decreasing with lima→∞ x0(a) = 0, and that x1(a)
is strictly increasing with lima→∞ x1(a) = 1 (see Fig. 3). The function x0(a) corresponds to X’s bluff bets, and x1(a) to his
value bets. For Y’s calling strategy, we assume that he calls a bet of a > a∗ if and only if his hand is greater than or equal
to y1(a) for some function y1 : [a∗,∞) → (0, 1). We assume that x0(a) ≤ y1(a) ≤ x1(a) for a ∈ [a∗,∞). We will use the
notation x∗0 = x0(a∗), x∗1 = x1(a∗), y∗1 = y1(a∗).
Assume first that Y’s strategy is fixed, and that Xhas a handof x. KnowingY’s strategy y1(a), if X bets hewill bet the amount
whichmaximizes his expected payoff. For bluff bets this expected payoff is f (a) = y1(a)P+(1−y1(a))

(P+a)q−a(1−q),
independently of x. The first-order condition yields
∂ f (a)
∂a
= y′1(a)

P − (P + a)q− a(1− q) − (1− y1(a))(1− 2q) != 0 (21)
for a ∈ (a∗,∞). Similarly, for X’s value bets the expected payoff is g(a) = y1(a)P + (x − y1(a))

(P + a)(1 − q) − aq +
(1− x)(P + a)q− a(1− q), and the first-order condition yields
∂g(a)
∂a
= y′1(a)

P − (P + a)(1− q)− aq+ (x− y1(a))− (1− x)(1− 2q) = 0, (22)
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from which we derive the indifference equation
y′1(a)

P − (P + a)(1− q)− aq+ (2x1(a)− y1(a)− 1)(1− 2q) != 0 (23)
for a ∈ (a∗,∞) (note that we replaced x by x1(a) after taking the derivative). Now suppose that X’s strategy is fixed. If Y is
faced with a bet of a > a∗, clearly his payoff is 0 if he folds. From a bet of a, player Y can deduce that X either bluffs with
the hand x0(a) or bets for value with the hand x1(a). For a hand x0(a) ≤ y ≤ x1(a), he will call if his expected payoff h(a) is
positive. To calculate h(a), he needs to take into account the probability with which a bet of a is a bluff compared to a being
a value bet. This ratio of bluff bets to value bets of a is given by the ratio of the slopes−x′0(a) and x′1(a), and with (5) and (6)
(recall that we assumed x0(a) ≤ y1(a) ≤ x1(a)) we obtain the third equation,
∂h(a)
∂a
= −x′0(a)

(P + a)(1− q)− aq+ x′1(a)(P + a)q− a(1− q) != 0 (24)
for a ∈ (a∗,∞).
Solving the system of differential equations (21), (23) and (24) requires further boundary conditions. We require that at
X’s bluff threshold x∗0 = x0(a∗), checking and betting a∗ should have the same expected payoff, i.e.,
x∗0P

1− q)+ (1− x∗0)Pq != y∗1P + (1− y∗1)

(P + a∗)q− a∗(1− q). (25)
The last boundary condition is given by the assumption that
lim
a→∞ x0(a)
!= 0. (26)
Solving the system of differential equations (21), (23) and (24) under the boundary conditions (25) and (26) yields
x0(a) = 1− q7− 2q · P
2 · (1− 3q)P + 3(1− 2q)a
(1− q)P + (1− 2q)a3 , (27)
x1(a) = 1− 2q7− 2q ·
(1− q)(4− q)P2 + 2(1− q)(7− 2q)aP + (1− 2q)(7− 2q)a2
(1− q)P + (1− 2q)a2 , (28)
y1(a) = 1− 2q7− 2q ·
(1− q)P + (7− 2q)a
(1− q)P + (1− 2q)a . (29)
Moreover, straightforward calculation gives
x∗0 = x0(a∗) =
1− q
7− 2q , x
∗
1 = x1(a∗) =
4+ q
7− 2q , y
∗
1 = y1(a∗) =
1+ 4q
7− 2q .
Note that for all values of qwe have x∗0 < y
∗
1 < x
∗
1 .
We shall prove that for 0 ≤ q < 1/2 an equilibrium is given by the following pair of strategies, where
x0(a), x1(a), y1(a), x∗0, x
∗
1 , and a
∗ are as defined above. As a function of his hand x, player X bets an amount of
a(x) =

a, x = x0(a) ∈ (0, x∗0)
0, x ∈ [x∗0, 1/2]
a∗, x ∈ (1/2, x∗1]
a, x = x1(a) ∈ (x∗1, 1).
(30)
Since both x0 : [a∗,∞)→ (0, x∗0] and x1 : [a∗,∞)→ [x∗1, 1) are bijective, a(x) is indeed well defined.1Player Y, holding a
hand of y, calls a bet of a if and only if (y, a) is in
C =

(y, a) | a ≤ a∗ ∨ y ≥ y1(a)

. (31)
Fig. 3 illustrates these strategies for q = 0 and q = 1/3.
In order to verify that these strategies indeed form an equilibrium pair, we prove two stronger claims, showing that, if
one of the two strategies is fixed, there is in fact a large class of deterministic counterstrategies.
1 An alternative equilibrium pair is obtained by replacing x0(a) with x∗0 − x0(a), as is done in [8]. Instead of betting arbitrarily large amounts a as x
approaches 0, X’s bet size then diverges as x → x∗0 .
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Claim 7. Any calling strategy C˜ of player Y satisfying
y > x1(a) H⇒ (y, a) ∈ C˜ (32)
y < x0(a) H⇒ (y, a) ∉ C˜ (33)
a ≤ a∗ H⇒ (y, a) ∈ C˜ (34)
is a best response to X’s betting strategy (30).
Proof. We first show that the restrictions (32)–(34) reflect the pointwise optimal behavior of Y when faced with a bet of a
holding a hand of y.
Recall that Y’s expected payoff when calling is given by (5) or (6). If Y is faced with a bet of size a > a∗, there are exactly
two hands X can possibly have: a value bet hand x1(a) and a bluff bet hand x0(a), where x0(a) < x1(a). Thus with any hand
y < x0(a), Y’s expected payoff is given by (5) and is strictly less than (P + a∗)q− a∗(1− q) = 0, since (5) is decreasing in a.
Conversely,with anyhand y > x1(a), Y’s expected payoff is given by (6) and strictly larger than (P+a∗)(1−q)−a∗q = P > 0.
As moreover for a ≤ a∗ both (5) or (6) are nonnegative, his expected payoff will be nonnegative when calling such hands,
regardless of his hand y. This proves that indeed the restrictions given by (32)–(34) correspond to Y’s pointwise optimal
behavior.
It remains to show that it is completely irrelevant what Y does in the remaining situations (y, a). For a fixed hand y and
any call strategy C˜ satisfying (32)–(34), his expected payoff against X’s strategy (30) conditional on no flip occurring is∫ 1
0
(P + a(x))1{(y,a(x))∈C˜∧y>x} − a(x)1{(y,a(x))∈C˜∧y<x} dx
(30) and (34)=
∫ a∗
∞

(P + a)1{(y,a)∈C˜∧y>x0(a)} − a1{(y,a)∈C˜∧y<x0(a)}

x′0(a) da
+
∫ 1/2
x∗0
P1{y>x} dx+
∫ x∗1
1/2
(P + a∗)1{y>x} − a∗1{y<x} dx
+
∫ ∞
a∗

(P + a)1{(y,a)∈C˜∧y>x1(a)} − a1{(y,a)∈C˜∧y<x1(a)}

x′1(a) da
(32) and (33)=
∫ a∗
∞
(P + a)1{(y,a)∈C˜}x′0(a) da+
∫ 1/2
x∗0
P1{y>x} dx+
∫ x∗1
1/2
(P + a∗)1{y>x} − a∗1{y<x} dx
+
∫ ∞
a∗

(P + a)1{y>x1(a)} − a(1{(y,a)∈C˜} − 1{y>x1(a)})

x′1(a) da
= C0(y)−
∫ ∞
a∗

(P + a)x′0(a)+ ax′1(a)

1{(y,a)∈C˜} da (35)
for some function C0(y) independently of C˜. Similarly, conditional on a flip occurring the expected payoff of player Y is
C1(y)+
∫ ∞
a∗

ax′0(a)+ (P + a)x′1(a)

1{(y,a)∈C˜} da (36)
for some other function C1(y) independently of C˜. Combining (35) and (36) and using the fact that x0(a), x1(a) as defined in
(27) and (28) satisfy (24) yield that the total expectedpayoff against X’s strategy (30) for a fixedhand y is (1−q)C0(y)+qC1(y),
independently of C˜. 
Claim 8. For any functiona(x) : (0, x∗0)→ (a∗,∞), X’s betting strategy
a(x) =

a(x), x ∈ (0, x∗0)
0, x ∈ [x∗0, 1/2]
a∗, x ∈ (1/2, x∗1]
a, x = x1(a) ∈ (x∗1, 1)
is a best response to Y’s calling strategy (31).
Proof. The first decision X has to make is whether to bet an amount a > a∗ or an amount 0 ≤ a ≤ a∗. As in the latter case
Y will always call, X’s expected payoff is given by (7) and thus maximized for a = 0 if x < 1/2, and for a = a∗ if x > 1/2.
The resulting expected payoffs are
P

(1− 2q)x+ q (37)
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and
x

(P + a∗)(1− q)− a∗q+ (1− x)(P + a∗)q− a(1− q) = Px, (38)
respectively.
We need to compare these values to the expected payoff X can achieve by betting more than a∗. Betting any amount
a > a∗ with a hand of x ≤ y1(a) yields an expected payoff of
y1(a)P + (1− y1(a))

(P + a)q− a(1− q) = P(1+ 4q)/(7− 2q), (39)
independently of a and x. (This independence of a is a consequence of the fact that y1(a) as defined in (29) satisfies (21).)
Comparing (39) to (37) shows that, for hands x < (1− q)/(7− 2q) = x∗0 , this is indeed better than checking, reflecting the
boundary condition (25).
Similarly, betting any amount a > a∗ with a hand of x > y1(a) yields an expected payoff of
y1(a)P + (x− y1(a))

(P + a)(1− q)− aq+ (1− x)(P + a)q− a(1− q), (40)
which is increasing for a near a∗ and decreasing for a →∞, as can be seen from the expression in (22). Thus the expected
payoff is maximized for the unique a ∈ (a∗,∞) satisfying (22), which is a satisfying x1(a) = x (see (23)). The resulting
expected payoff is
P

10(2− q)/(7− 2q)− x− 43(1− x)(1− q)/(7− 2q), (41)
as is found by inverting (28) and plugging the resulting function a(x) into (40). Comparing this to (38) shows that, for hands
x > (4+ q)/(7− 2q) = x∗1 , this is indeed better than the alternative of betting a∗. 
From the equilibrium pair of deterministic strategies (30) and (31), we can easily calculate the value of the game. Let Ex
denote X’s expected payoff when holding a hand of x, with X and Y playing strategies (30) and (31). Combining (37)–(39)
and (41), we obtain
Ex =

P
1+ 4q
7− 2q , x ∈ (0, x
∗
0)
P

(1− 2q)x+ q, x ∈ [x∗0, 1/2]
Px, x ∈ (1/2, x∗1]
P

10(2− q)
7− 2q − x− 4

3(1− x)(1− q)
7− 2q

, x ∈ (x∗1, 1).
Integrating Ex over (0, 1)we obtain VII(q) as stated in Theorem 2.
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